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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR GRAH~\~I, 
Pla,intiff and Respondent 
and Cross-Appella!nt, 
vs. 
EVAN E. STREET and ~IAX 
SIEGEL, 




BRIEF OF APPELLANT, MAX SIEGEL 
STATEl\IENT OF THE FACTS 
This case was decided below in two parts. First, 
there was a decision determining the question of liability 
of the defendants. This dete-rmination was appealed 
(166 P. 2d 524) and the judgment against defendants 
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sustained. Second, was the determination of the extent 
of plaintiff:s remedy against defendants, which is now 
appealed. 
The wide difference between the parties arises from 
the granting of a judgment for $5,000.00 as damages 
for alleged mental suffering and $5,000.00 more as 
punitive damages. r:rhese were allowed in addition to 
the partnership accounting of profits arising from the 
partnership basis of liability as decided on the first 
appeal; and which partnership accounting is not in sub-
stantial dispute. 
There is also now a cross-appeal herein based on 
still another claim of recovery or damage, i.e., on the 
alleged rental value of partnership equipment. 
We will try to state the facts material to all the 
contentions, and essential to an understanding of the 
present issues, but will not attempt to now present all 
that may be claimed on plaintiff's cross-appeal if that 
is urged. 
Plaintiff first filed complaint :May 13, 1944. This 
complaint (R. 389) was against Evan Street alone as 
defendant. It alleged a parol partnership agreement 
made about September 1, 1943, between these two parties, 
to acquire and operate caterpillar tractor equipment 
and divide the profits. It recited that defendant, Street, 
had "conspired with other parties * * * to exclude the 
plaintiff from any management or control of said part-
nership business." (R. 380). The prayer so far as now 
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material was for "an aeeountin~, mHl ~ueh other reliPI' 
as may be just ... 
~-\.fter answer by defendant Ntreet, an arnended con1-
plaint was filed by one of plaintiff's present attorneys 
(396) on ~-\.pril 11, 19-15. As this Court on fin~t appeal 
pointed out. this c01nplaint pleaded s01ne detail, but 
did not change the theory or sub::-:tance of the first com-
plaint. It added defendant Siegel a~ a party, and added, 
as allegations of the partnership agreernent, that the 
"equipment was to be operated" by defendant Street 
(397), "for the sum of $1.~5 per hour," and also that 
Street was "placed in charge of the equiprnent." (398). 
Also that defendants ·•continued to operate the said 
equipment * * * until January 10, 1945," when they 
sold it (400). 
As to defendant Siegel, this alleged additionally 
that he paid $4,500.00 for the equipment and that the 
Bill of Sale ran to hin1. Also, that the money frorn the 
operation of it had been turned over to him (401). 
After trial on this con1plaint and the answers, find-
ings (84), and an "Interlocutory and Decree" (89) were 
entered on June 15, 1945. The finding recited the alle-
gations of the complaint. The conclusions of law were 
followed in the decree and these recited ( 89) that a 
partnership was entered into and still continued to exist. 
That its assets consisted of the caterpillar equipment 
described and which the defendants had been operating. 
Both defendants were ordered to file ''an accounting" 
within 20 days. This requirement was stated at some 
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length (90) and required that it cover a cmnplete part-
nership accounting in every detail with all receipts and 
expenses ( 90). ~1here was no distinction as between the 
two defendants as to the theory of their liability found, 
or in the nature of the judgrnent against each of them, 
or the requirernent of accounting. r.rhere was, however, 
an added recital that the defendant Siegel have an offset 
for the $4,500.00 paid by hiin for the equipment (90). 
The Court retained jurisdiction "to settle all account~ 
between the parties hereto, dissolve the partnership,*** 
and to ruake such other order as may be just and equi-
table * * * ." 
The opinion of this Court on the appeal from this 
judgment (166 P. 2d 524) is important and helpful as 
showing the issues pleaded, the supporting evidence, 
and particularly the basis and theory of defendant's 
liability, and of plaintiff's remedy. 
This opinion describes the nature of the case and 
of the decree below in the first paragraph, p. 526, as 
follows: 
"Appeal from an interlocutory decree and 
the findings in support of it, holding that a part-
nership had been formed between plaintiff Gra-
ham and defendant Street on August 6, 1943, 
and that Street and Siegel through connivance 
diverted frorn plaintiff the use of partnership 
property and the partnership earnings, and order-
ing an accounting." 
The opinion after referring to the procedures above 
recited said : 
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"The cmnplaint • * •, sets forth an action 
in equity, the rery core of which is the fraudulent 
action of the defendants, Street and Siegel, in 
conniu,ing to undo a partnership between Grahmn 
and Street, and to keep frmu Grahan1 the prope,rty 
and fruits of his alleged partnership with Street." 
'"The allegations of plaintiff's partnership 
with Street are necessary and prelin1inary to 
arrive at the part that Street and Siegel played 
in disrupting the relationship of Graham and 
Street * * •." 
• • • 
"The gist of the cause for complaint is the 
action of Siegel and Street in disrupting the 
partnership of Graham and Street and defraud-
ing Grahan1. The prayer reveals the nature of 
the relief demanded, to-wit, 'that an accounting 
be taken of all the monies colleeted by the de-
fendants and each of them' * * *." (P. 527, par. 
3-5). 
Further with relation to Siegel and what is called 
"fraud," the opinion (p. 528, par. 6-7) says: 
"It is * * *logical to conceive of the complaint 
as constructed about the ,central transactions 
whereby Siegel allegedly insinuated himself in 
the Graham and Street relationship * * * ." 
"Siegel * * * not succeeding in getting Gra-
ham to agree to a 1nodification of what was a 
loan agreement, he then used his title in con-
nivance with Street to divert what was in reality 
Graham-Street equipment * * * to his own pur-
poses • • *." (p. 529). 
. "" . 
"All that is asked in this action is to declare 
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the status of the parties, the status of the equip-
ment, and to obtain an accounting if it is found 
that a partnership existed between Graham and 
Street and that such partnership owned the equity 
in the equipment bought * '1., *." (p. 530). 
Coming then to basic elements of plaintiff's right to 
relief, the opinion at p. 530, para. 10 asks: 
"Was there a partnership between Graham 
and Street 1" 
It sustains the trial court in its holding that there 
was, and quotes and approves the trial court's finding: 
•·'rhat defendants have conspired to take pos-
session of the partnership property of Graham 
and Street, to collect and misappropriate the 
funds earned in the operation of the equipment 
* * *, and to exclude plaintiff from any manage-
ment or control of said partnership business***." 
As the basis for sustaining the trial court's decision 
of the continuation of this partnership, which had no 
agreed term of existence, the opinion said : 
"A partnership at will may be dissolved by 
one partner unequivocally bringing home notice 
to the other partner that he no longer intends 
to be a partner." Citing a number of cases at p. 
535, par. 17. 
"On September 22, (1943) * * * there was 
talk of each buying out the other; that Street 
was willing to take his wages and call it quits; 
that Siegel was willing to take $300.00 for his 
'interest' and let Grahmn have the 'cat'. But no 
agreement was reached. Graham thought his 
interest worth at least $1,000.00. They parted 
without any agreement to terminate; therefore 
(; 
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there was no tern1ination on that date." (p. 
535, par. 16). 
"If the partnership ceased to exist in fact 
by the conduct Street brought home· to Grahmn 
or by the answer of Street denying the partner-
ship filed May 29, Hl-!-!, whirh must be considered 
notice to Graham, or after the sale of the property 
on January 12, 1945, eqnity will nevertheless treat 
the partnership as e;1_·istin,rJ and require an ac-
counting of the profits. Equity will not per1nit 
a party in a relationship of trust and confidence 
to pro fit from his o·wn wrong." ( p. 535, par. 19). 
* * * 
"In this case Street used property belonging 
to the partnership treating it as belonging to 
Siegel, refusing to account to Graham for the 
monies collected for the use of the tractor, but the 
property will in eqttity be considered as being 
used for the benefit of the Graha~Stree:t pa.rt-
nership, an accounting of profits to be made to 
this partnership." (p. 535, par. 18). 
"The decree of the lower Court, dated .June 
15, 1945, is affirmed." (p. 536). 
This opinion is dated February 15, 1946. On peti-
tion for rehearing, certain words in the next to the last 
paragraph were stricken out ( 434). These words are 
therefore left out in the above quotation. The final 
remittitur on this appeal was issued July 29, 1946 ( 427), 
and was filed August 1, 1946 ( 445). 
The accounting as ordered by the court of the de-
fendants was filed herein September 3, 1946 (17). A 
pleading ter1ned "objections to accounting by defend-
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ants and supplemental complaint" was then filed October 
2, 1946. In this, plaintiff (17) made objection that the 
accounting was 'contrary' to the former decree in some 
parts ( 18) and also set forth some affirmative allega-
tions in paragraphs 9 to 17 on which was predicted a 
claim for rejection of the accounting remedy, and for 
recovery of the rental value of the equipment, as dam-
aged. 
Since there are no findings on these allegations or 
sustaining this claim or theory of damage at all, these 
allegations and the evidence in support thereof, need 
not be pursued now. The failure to make findings or 
give judgment on this claim is, we believe, the basis 
of defendant's cross-appeal which can be appropriately 
1net, ,if we get to that. 
There is, however, another allegation which is more 
material on the appeal. This is par. 19 of this pleading 
(20) which says: 
"That in equity and good conscience the 
accountings made by the defendants and each of 
them should be rejected for the reasons herein-
above set forth, and the accounting made on a 
rental basis as hereinabove set forth;" 
The prayer on this (21) asks: 
"That the accountings and each of them made 
by the defendants herein be rejected by this 
court." 
The prayer is then devoted mostly to this claim for 
damages as rental on the equipment (21) "in the sum 
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of $jj,756.00, and for the further su1n of $1,~71.00 pt>r 
month," frmn the date of this pleading and also $88,-
777.33 for loss of "'future rentals.'' 
\Ye find no allegation in this plentling with refer-
ence to dmnages for 1nental suffering or for damag<>s 
at all, except this one for rental Yalue dmnages, and 
nothing relating to punitiYe dmuages, in any way. 1-Iow-
ever, before leaving it, we point out that during the 
trial and on motion granted by th~ trial court (17~), 
there was inserted by ink in the prayer only (21): 
"YII. That the defendants and each of then1 pay 
to the plaintiff the su1n of $50,000.00 as 
punitiYe damages.'' 
This amendment was over our objections that there 
was no pleading to support this added paragraph (172). 
After defendant's answers to the supplemental corn-
plaint of plaintiff, were filed ( 44, 58) which included and 
brought the accounting up-to-date by slight additions 
(62), (66), and the furnishing of additional information 
as requested by plaintiff (55) ; and after the court had 
sustained plaintiff's motion to strike out a good deal 
of the defendant's answers including their affirmative 
defenses (4-2), the case went to second trial January 3, 
1951 (135). 
1ll at erial Facts on Second Trial 
The partnership equipment was added to, by the 
purchase of a belt loader by Mr. Siegel Octobe-r 6, 1943 
c (192). This was necessary additional equipment to ele-
vate the loosened dirt out of the basements so that it 
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could be rnoved away (278). The small service truck, 
also purchased by him was necessary to pick up parts 
for the tractor, make necessary trips, and haul tank~ 
of diesel fuel for the partnership equipment (280). 
The partnership equipment was in poor condition 
when procured from Bothwell in 1943, and needed a 
cornplete overhaul. Such job would have cost from 
$2,500.00 to $3,000.00 (315) or $2,750.00 (243) if done 
at a shop equipped for such work. Appellant thought 
that he could have done all that he could do in overhaul-
ing for about $2,000.00 (314). 
Defendant Street did replace parts and repair it 
so as to keep it going up to January, 1944, and then 
when it could not be operated, he engaged an old build-
ing, and with some assistance did a partial job of rebuild-
ing and repairing (290-293). This was not new or up-to-
date equipment (288). The partnership equipment new 
would have cost at least $12,500.00 (253). And even if 
new, it could depreciate about one-third in value in about 
sixty (60) days of use (236) and would steadily require 
replacement and repairs (238-239). 
They had work for this equipment during the whole 
period of possession and operated it always, except 
for break-downs (290) and bad weather (280). In Jan-
uary, the ground became so frozen that they couldn't 
do much. Except when so prevented, the equipment 
was operated continuously (270-280) and at the full 
going rate of pay (281). 
It was sold January 12, 1945, by Mr. Street, before 
10 
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he joined the Navy, for the agreed price of $4,500.00, 
and this amount c_harged to illr. Siegel in the account 
(54). The sale was to Stanley Roberts (3~) who had 
previously hauled the equip1uent for JHr. Street to dif-
ferent parts of the state, where Street had operated it 
(3:2:2). Roberts contracted to pay J\!Ir. Siegel only 
$4,056.00, however ( 32-!, 398), because they were indebted 
to Roberts for a balance due for hauling the equipment 
of about $400.00, which was deducted (32-!). At the 
time of trial, January 1951, there was still $4,000.00 
of this $4,056.00 still unpaid to l\Ir. Siegel (197). This 
was six years after the sale. 
The equipment when sold to l\Ir. Roberts was in 
bad repair (325-328), and repairs and replacements from 
1945 to about 1948 took more than the receipts from the 
operation of it. He had to borrow $1,750.00 to make up 
this loss (345). He testified that this partnership equip-
ment was old in model and was not in demand by "cat 
skinners" or those requiring work, or for rental by 
operators ( 349-350). 
The accounts from which the accounting was made 
by defendants were kept in a book, Exhibit "N", by Mr. 
Street and his wife (173). The receipts were entered 
there along with the records of the jobs he was employed 
on, and of his time. Expenses, except son1e out-of-pocket 
payments (160) paid by him, were also entered in this 
book. Except for such small expense payments, all 
receipts were turned over to Mr. Siegel who receipted 
in the book (193), Exhibit "N", for them, and all the 
11 
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payments of bills and invoices were first checked by 
Mr. Street (193) and paid by the check of Siegel on the 
"special account" kept for this operation. The defend-
ants checked up on each other, for their own protection 
( 193), and agreed on the payrnents to be made out of 
the account ( 177). r~eheir respective accounts on the 
whole operation reconciled with each other within $25.20 
(6, 53, 175). 
Street did not charge Graham, or in the accounting-, 
for the time he spent in arranging for jobs, collecting-
for work done, or the keeping of accounts or like work 
(300-301). 
The disputed accounting item of insurance, $170.57, 
on page 6 of the account (180) was for liability insur-
ance on the partnership equipment (184) and was paid 
for, at the going rate for such insurance (192). Every 
account paid was approved by l\1r. Street before a check 
was issued (145) and this charge for this amount was 
so approved, and set up as expenses in his accounting 
(13). 
While the defendant Street was so taking care of 
and operating the equipment and the business was so 
carried on, plaintiff was operating the Probst, Clyde & 
Graham similar equipn1ent and in 1945 he received 
therefrom one-third the profits in addition to his hourly 
payment as an operator (264, 169). In the fall of 1943 
when the partnership equipment went to American Fork, 
he moved his equipment to Heber for work contracted 
there and to "get away from Orem," as had been in-
12 
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tended (~63). He hin1self arquired thi::; other equipment 
from Probst & Clyde in 19-!-! ( 269) and thereafter oper-
ated it for himself. He got additional equipment in 1945 
(267) and later substantially 1nore equip1nent, all of 
which he was operating prior to and at the tiine of the 
trial (:ZG7). He received as 1nuch per day for his equip-
ment as Street received (270). 
POINrrs RELIED UPON 
I. 
There is no basis in the pleading, or in the evidence, 
or in law for the award by the trial court of: 
(a) Compensatory dan1ages, for mental suffering, 
or at an, or 
(b) Punitive damages (118, 122). 
II. 
It was error to charge against the Defendants the 
sum of $1,932.00 for so-called "idle time" of partnership 
equipment. 
III. 
It was error to strike from aecounting the expense 
item of $170.57 paid for liability insurance on the part-
nership equipment (116). 
IV. 
It was error to charge interest on balance of the 
account on the partnership accounting; especially 
to charge interest for seven years after 1946 when the 
13 
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accounting was rendered by defendants as ordered, and 
it was ever since rejected by plaintiff (121, 122). 
v. 
It was error to reject and strike defendant's allega-
tions and to refuse to consider plaintiff's laches or in-
equitable delays, inequitable claims, and inequitable con-
duct and failure to do or offer to do equity ( 462, 45-50). 
BRIEF AND ARGUl\fENT 
POINT I. 
THERE IS NO BASIS IN THE PLEADING, 
OR IN THE EVIDENCE, OR IN LAW FOR THE 
AWARD BY THE TRIAL COURT OF: (a) COM-
PENSATORY DAMAGES, FOR MENTAL SUFFER-
ING, OR AT ALL, OR (b) PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
The point of law is that there can be no recovery of 
damages at all for acts udisrupting1 ' or "to undo" or for 
causing dissolution, of a partnership at will, or for excl1t-
sion of plaintiff from participation in the partnership 
as it was continued by the Court in equity. 
These are the only delicts relied upon for relief by 
plaintiff. There can, therefore, be no recovery of the 
damages here allowed, because : 
(1) The law does not permit such. 
(2) If the law did permit it, there is no such 
claim pleaded, or proved. 
( 3) The election to affirm the partnership rela-
tionship and obtain an accounting in equity, 
bars a claim for damages for breach. 
As quoted from the opinion of the Court supra, this 
14 
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action is one brought in equity and for a partnership 
accounting. The ren1edy by accounting obtained in equity 
is the only redress which the pleaded theory of action, 
will support. The trial Court, notwithstanding that this 
partnership agreement was without any ter1n of exist-
ence, nevertheless held that the partnership had con-
tinued to exist, in order to require defendants to account. 
This Court thus sustained the findings that the 
partnership had continued, but it was necessary to supply 
the equitable fictions as above quoted in order so to do. 
This continuation of the partnership for the purpose of 
requiring an accounting can supply no basis for assess-
ing damages in addition to the amount due under the 
accounting. 
This Court, 1n fact, stated and supported the law 
with relation to partnerships at will (166 P. 2d p. 535, 
par. 17) as follows: 
"A partnership at will n1ay be dissolved 
by one partner unequivocally bringing home 
notice to the other partners that he no longer 
intends to be a partner. Pierce v. Feno, 'Sup., 
184 NYS 851; Brady v. Powers, 112 App. Div. 
845, 849, 850, 98 NYS 273; Spears v. Willis, 151 
NY 443, 449, 45 NE 849; Houston v. :McCrory, 
140 Old. 21, 282 P. 149." 
But, nevertheless, held that to prevent "a party 
in a relationship of trust and confidence to profit from 
his own wrong," the partnership "properties will in equity 
be considered as being used for the benefit of the· Graham 
15 
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and Street partnership and accounting of profits required 
to be made to thispartnership." 
There are three matters, the mention of which, will 
clear the way for the citation of authorities. 
First, there is no claim alleged or found that the 
contract here was for a "joint undertaking" for a par-
ticular job, or what is termed a "particular undertaking." 
The whole case and on both trials has been based on a 
continuing partnership covering at least 50 to 70 differ-
ent scattered jobs . (9, 11, and Exhibit "N"), and 15 
months. 
Second, there is no claim alleged or based on any 
conduct or delict other than the "conspiring" or "con-
niving" to undo a partnership and to keep from Graham 
the property and fruits of his alleged partnership; or, 
as otherwise stated, it is the "part that Street and Siegel 
played in disrupting the partnership." (P. 527). 
So while the term "fraud" is used, particularly in 
discussing other points in the opinion, where it is said 
that Mr. Siegel agreed to make a loan and then claimed 
to be the owner instead of the mortgage holder in order 
to make a better deal and that he "insinuated himself 
into the Grahan1-Street partnership;" no claim for relief 
is based, or raised by any allegations, or at all, in so far 
as these acts by themselves were concerned. He would 
have a right to refuse to make a loan. These acts are 
cited in the opinion on first appeal only in establishing 
the so-called conspiracy to disrupt or "undo." However, 
16 
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nothing is better settled than that no cause of action 
arises from a Inere conspiracy to do sOinething. 
llloropoulos vs. Fuller (Cal.), 200 P. 601, 604. 
A conspiracy merely has the effect of bringing in, 
and charging, others with actionable or unlawful acts 
committed. It has been held, ~Ir. Siegel was so brought 
in here, but as the case just cited shows relief n1ust be 
based upon the acts which the conspirators join to com-
• mit, and it is not sufficient merely to allege a "conspiracy 
to defraud plaintiff." 
The acts here complained of and found we-re acts "to 
undo" this partnership at will. Thus they tried to deprive 
plaintiff of the fruits of the operation of the partner-
ship property, but this, the Court of equity prevented by 
treating Mr. Siegel as a mortgagor though he held the 
legal title, and treating the partnership as continuing 
even though it was not that kind of partnership. 
The third matter, mention of which will help to 
clarify the situation here, is that the equitable relief of 
an accounting was, necessarily, rested upon the basis 
that this property of the partnership, and which was 
operated by defendants, would, "in equity, be considered 
as being used for the benefit of Graham-Street partner-
ship and accounting of profits required to be made to 
this partnership." 
Thus, it is obvious, that if Street had just quit or 
withdrawn from the contemplated partnership arrange-
ment to get and operate some equipment, there would 
17 
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be no cause of action, even for accounting. Or, if it had 
proceeded to the point where the equipment was acquired, 
and he had simply refused to go on with the project 
and had not taken and used the equipment, there would 
be no cause. It could not change this situation if he 
were induced so to act by Siegel. The use of partnership 
property supplied the basis for the accounting. 
So, on these bases, the judgment for an accounting 
as entered below was sustained by this Court on first 
appeal. 
In fact, this Court said ( p. 530) : 
"All that is asked in this action is to declare 
the status of the parties, the status of the equip-
ment and to obtain an accounting* * *." 
I. No Legal Right to Damages. 
That the law does not permit recovery of damages 
for the attempt to undo or disrupt a partnership at will 
is supported both by the cases and by our statute. It 
rests fundamentally, of course, on the law as quoted 
from the decision of this Court above that any partner 
has a right to terminate, disrupt, or undo such a partner-
ship. 
40 Am. Jur., p. 461, sec. 482: 
"Wrongful Dissolution of Partnership dur-
ing Term Stipulated in Articles. It has frequently 
been decided that the partnen;hip relation does 
not preclude the n1aintenance of an action at law 
by one partner against the other for damage~ 
for a breach of the copartnership agreement in 
18 
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wrongfully dissolving the partnership duriu9 llu~ 
term, provided the plaintiff has kept his cove-
nants. • • • The right depends on the fact that 
such dissolution is brought about in violation of 
the agreement between the partners. If a firw 
is one dissolrable at will, 110 rigld to reco1wr 
darna.ges 1rill rrsult from i.ts disruptio'l'l." 
The note to this cites, mnong other case~, BttrnstiPn 
vs. Giest, 15 N.Y.S. (2) -!S, which case eited the rule 
from R.C.L; SfPzcart vs. Ulrich C\Vash.), 201 P. 16, 19. 
This case on its facts is smnewhat similar to the one 
at bar as is also indicated fron1 the following frmn the 
opinion: 
"The complaint being silent as to the time 
when the partnership would tenninate, we 1nust 
asssume that it would tenninate with the lease. 
Zimmerman v. Harding (227 U.S. 489, 33 Sup. 
Ct. 387, 57 L. Ed. 608), or that it might be tennin-
ated at will without giving rise to a cause of 
action to recover damages for its disruption (20 
R.C.L. 927, Sec. 142). In either event, with the 
certainty that it must terminate February 1, 1920, 
or sooner, if respondent so willed, the gist of the 
complaint is that respondent concealed the fact 
that he had made an agreement to conduct a 
similar business in the premises with or for, 
Durkin, the owner, and thus procured the execu-
tion of the second contract, which definitely 
terminated the copartnership, and made disposi-
tion of its assets. * * * So, too, after the termina-
tion of the copartnership Ulrich had an absolute 
right to engage in any business he pleased, with 
whom he pleased, and owed no duty to advise his 
partners in advance of his affairs." 
19 
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20 R.C.L., P. 927, Sec. 142: 
"A suit may also be maintained for the act 
of a copartner in dissolving the firm before the 
period limited by the articles of copartnership. 
• • • The right to recover damages for the dis-
solution of a partnership depends, however, on 
the fact that such dissolution is brought ahout 
in violation of the agreement between the part-
ners. If a firm is one dissolvable at will no right 
to recover damages will result from its disrup-
tion." 
This last sentence is supported by a case there cited 
from Montana, and also a note. 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 959. 
So, also, our statutes plainly adopt and enact the 
rule just quoted. 
"69-1-35 U.C.A. 1943: Rights of Partners to 
Application of Partnership Property. 
"(1) When dissolution is caused in any way, 
except in contravention of the partnership agree-
ment, each partner, as against his copartners and 
all persons claiming through them in respect of 
their interests in the partnership, unless other-
wise agreed, may have the partnership property 
applied to discharge its liabilities, and the surplus 
applied to pay in cash the net amount owing to 
the respective partners. But if dissolution is 
caused by expulsion of a partner, hona fide· under 
the partnership agreement, and if the expelled 
partner is discharged from all partnership lia-
bilities either by payment or agreement under 
section 69-1-33 (2), he shall receive in cash only 
the net amount due him frorn the partnership. 
"(2) When dissolution is caused in contra-
20 
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'Vention of the partner~hip ngrPement the rights 
of the partners shall be as follows : 
••(a) Each partner who has not caused dis-
solution wrongfully shall haY~: 
.. 1. All the rights specified in paragraph (1) 
of this section ; and, 
•·2. The right as again8t each partner who 
has caused the dissolution wrongfully 
to damages for breach of the agreeinent. '' 
So, under (1), if delict of causing dissolution or 
attempting ·'to undo" was not "in contravention of the 
partnership agreement," as it plainly was not here, or 
if the "dissolution" were caused "by expulsion" ( exclu-
sion), then the right of plaintiff is to have the partner-
ship bills paid, and to receive "in cash only the net 
amount due him from the partnership." We have been 
tendering this exact relief ever since 1946. 
On the other hand, under part ( 2) above, if such 
dissolution or attempt "to undo" had been "in contra-
vention of the partnership agreement," the plaintiff 
as the partner not causing "dissolution wrongfully would 
be entitled to damages for breach of the agreement." 
But, as above demonstrated, the attempt to end or ending 
of partnership with no agreed term of existence cannot 
be a "violation of the agreement." The following statute 
makes this even plainer. 
69-1-28. Dissolution is caused: 
"(1) Without violation of the agreen1ent 
between the partners : 
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"(b) By the express will of any partner 
when no definite term or particular undertaking 
is specified." 
Dissolution is caused: 
"(2) In contravention of the agreement be-
tween the partners, where the circumstances do 
not permit a dissolution under any other pro-
vision of this section, by the express will of any 
partner at any time." 
Plainly then, by the first paragraph, "dissolution" 
of this partnership or defendant's acts "to undo" it were 
"without violation" because it was dissolvable by the 
"express will of any partner." There can be no difference 
in the meaning of the words "violation," "breach," "con-
travention" as used in these two statutes. 
And note also that under part "(2)" again, it would 
be "in contravention" if the circumstances of the case 
did not permit dissolution "by the express will of any 
partner," and conversely, of course, it would not be in 
"contravention" if "dissolvable" by the "express will" 
of a partner as this Court has held, as quoted above, 
that this partnership was. (166 P. 2d 235, par. 17). 
While these statutes repeatedly use the word dis-
solution in referring to the acts affecting liability, the 
following definition shows that it plainly covers what 
was attempted here, as found by this Court. 
69-1-26. Dissolution Defined. 
"Th~ dissolution of a partnership is the 
change in the relation of the partners caused by 
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any partner eeasing to he n~~oeiated in the earry-
ing on, as distingui~lwd frmn the winding- np, 
of the business." 
E.rclus1:on. of Partner Gi.res Xo Riplit to Damages: 
If anything is claiined, or could be clainwd, hy reason 
of the fact that plaintiff was exeluded from the partnPr-
ship operation or the possession of the equipment as this 
Court and the trial Court said plaintiff was (118), this 
does not entitle hiin to the damages allowed. 
There has been maintained in law a definite dis-
tinction as to remedy, between disruption of a partner-
ship in violation of a contract for an agreed term, and 
the exclusion of a partner from a partnership operation 
which is continued by another partner. 
69-1-19. Right to an Account. 
"Any partner shall have the right to a formal 
account as to partnership affairs: (1) If he is 
wrongfully excluded from the partnership busi-
ness or possession of its property by his copart-
ners." 
This is in harmony with the first paragraph of 
69-1-35 dealing with an "expelled partner." This says if 
"dissolution," i.e., "change in the relation of the partners 
is caused by any partner ceasing to be associated'? 
(69-1-26), "by expulsion of a partner" operating under 
a bona fide partnership agreement, and the "expelled 
partner" is discharged from debts, as is here the case, 
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40 Am. J ur ., p. 462, Sec. 483 : 
"Measure of Damages-In case of a breach 
of the partnership agreement by dissolution, the 
damages recoverable include the value of the 
profits which the plaintiff otherwise would have 
received, or the value to him of the continuance 
of the agreement during the covenanted term, 
that is, prospective or anticipated profits. In the 
case of a partner wrongfully excluded from the 
business, he is entitled to his share of the profits 
on the completion of the venture." 
The note to the last sentence of the foregoing quo-
tation cites the following Utah case which was sustained 
by the Supreme Court of the United States and which 
is in point. The note also cites an annotation in 4 A.L.R. 
156. 
Karrick vs. Hanna man. This case is in 9 Utah 236 
and on appeal to the Supreme Court in 168 U.S. 328, 
42 L. Ed., 8 S. Ct. 135. 
It is quite similar to the one at bar in most essentials. 
However, the partnership was for a definite five-year 
term. Before expiration, one partner forceably expelled 
the other and thereafter excluded him. The partner in 
possession opera ted and later sold all the partnership 
properties. 
The Utah Court (p. 241) mentions the rule above 
cited as to the partnerships at will and says: 
"Where the partnership is merely at will, the 
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Both Courts in their discussions indicate that where 
it is terminated during the definite term agreed to, there 
is a cause of action for damages, but they did not treat 
this exclusion as a disruption of the partnership and 
therefore applied the principle that the excluded partner 
was entitled to an accounting· in equity. On this the 
Supreme Court said : 
•·In a court of equity, a partner who, after 
a dissolution of the partnership, carried on the 
business with the partnership property, is liable, 
at the election of the other partner or his repre-
sentative to account for the profits thereof, sub-
ject to proper allowance." (Citing cases). 
Nuland v. Pruyn, 216 P. 2d 526. 
This is a California case discussing partnership law 
on the question of damages for wrongful exclusion. The 
case cites the Annotation in 80 A.L.R. 12, and, after 
discussing the situation where the partnership is right-
fully dissolved, the opinion says: 
"On the contrary, for wrongf'ul expulsion and 
continued use of assets, as found by the court, 
a different rule applies generally, based upon an 
assumption of a continued partnership, with full 
participation in pro fits according to the ratio set 
up in the articles of partnership, at least for the 
period from the wrongful expulsion to actual 
dissolution by circumstances or decree of court." 
In view of the foregoing, it seems to be unneces-
sary to argue the point that even if damages were avail-
able to plaintiff here, the measure of damages is not that 
allowed by the trial Court. 
25 
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See: 4 A.L.R.159, 40 Am. Jur., P. 462. 
2. No Pleading or Evidence Establishes Basis for 
Damage: 
If this were a case in which damages were available 
because the conduct of defendants resulted in dissolution 
in "contravention" of a partnership agreement for a 
term, still there is no pleading or proof remotely related 
to the damages assessed here. 
We have already pointed out that the only damages 
pleaded or "claimed" are for rental value or on a "rental 
basis." The allegations (20) and the prayer rejected the 
partnership accounting basis (21). And the trial Court 
found no such damage as so alleged. 
The $10,000.00 damages allowed by the Court here 
(121, 122) are out of the clear sky. The findings are in 
Paragraphs 4 to 18 (118). They are, briefly: 
That the denial of Graham's rights "resulted in great 
turmoil and anxiety in his mind." 
That he had "the entree upon construction work at 
American Fork" which "carried the responsibility" to 
see that the work he had undertaken was efficiently per-
formed. 
He was deprived "of the right to anticipate an en-
largement of his business" and the right "to see that 
partnership obligations were promptly and fully met." 
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Outside of the fact that there wPre no pleading~ or 
proof of any of this. the evidence in faet shows that he 
never offered to take any interest or perforrr1 any of 
these things. That all work was fully performed hy 1\lr. 
Street as plaintiff had agreed it would be. rrhat plain-
tiff, on the other hand, went on with his own busine~s 
of operating similar equiputent and accumulating more. 
It is not sho,vn that he eYer knew of, or cared anything 
about any claims of creditors. He, by his own testi1nony, 
was going cheerfully on, running a competing business, 
making good money, and increasing his own equipn1ent 
and business. This accounting was purely a windfall. 
The grossly inequitable feature of this part is that 
he never prosecuted this action until three months after 
all of the debts were paid, including the debt to l\fr. 
Siegel for the equipment, and after it was known that 
a substantial profit had resulted from the operation. 
In other words, he waited and speculated on the outcmne, 
and there is every reason to believe that he would have 
never claimed any connection with this operation, as a 
partner or otherwise, if it had turned out badly from a 
disaster, or any other cause, or had left debts instead 
of substantial profits. 
This amount of money, in addition to what he is 
entitled to receive in the accotmting, is a pure and un-
justifiable enrichment. 
In Green v. Nelson (Utah), 232 P. 2d 776, 781, this 
Court in discussing the "general rule in actions for the 
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breach of contracts" quotes with approval the Appel-
late Court of Ohio as follows: 
"* * * he who seeks damages * * * bears the 
burden of proof, unless a statute otherwise dic-
tates, or knowledge is peculiarly within the pos-
session of the other contracting party, which 
must in such case bear the burden of producing 
it." 
The opinion of this Court then continues: 
"It was also declared that in cases of breach 
of contract courts should compensate but not 
reward the injured party, and that courts ought 
not to award punitive damages unless they are 
provided for by law." 
In any event, a claim for damages, if it would 
follow as a remedy, must be pleaded. This requires no 
citation of authority. 
As to punitive damages, there are again, no plead-
ings whatsoever to advise us of this claim. There is 
only the penned in paragraph of the prayer entered at 
the trial asking $50,000.00 punitive damages. 
Gilham v. Devereattx (_Mont.), 214 P. 606, lays down 
the general rule that punitive damages cannot be made 
the basis of recovery independent of a showing which 
would entitle plaintiff to an award of actual damages. 
This case in A.L.R. is followed by an Annotation, 33 
A.L.R. 384 at 385, states that this is the rule to which 
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"'rhe po~ition g-t'nerally takPn in the ea~e~ 
above is that, in order for an award of punitive 
drunages to be upheld, the plaintiff must have 
alleged, proved, and been awarded aetnal dam-
age~.·· 
This is then illustrated by Inany ca~('~ eoYt•ring a 
number of pages. 
In Evan~ v. Gaisford, :2-±7 P. 2d 431, this Court 
recently discussed the question of the comparative rela-
tion between general and punitive damages. The case 
did not directly involve the point now under discussion, 
but does leave the inference that there would need to be 
a legal claim to compensatory damages, and that punitive 
damages might not stand alone. 
Note, 123 A.L.R. at 1120. This note deals with 
punitive damages in cases of assault. The note at thi~ 
page cites a number of cases supporting a previous 
Annotation in 16 A.L.R. 788 for: 
"The rule that actual damages are a neces-
sary predicate for allowance of exemplary dam-
ages." 
So, it would seem that what we have said above 
with relation to compensatory damages also requires a 
reversal as to the $5,000.00 of punitive damages granted 
by the Court. 
15 Am. Jur., P. 766, Sec. 326. This section points 
out that if this were "an action for damages" and if 
it were alleged "that the wrong complained of was in-
flicted with malice, oppression, or other like circum-
29 
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stances of aggravation, exemplary damages may be 
recovered without being specially pleaded." 
The author then says: 
"If, however, the plaintiff indicates by his 
pleading his intention to recover compensatory 
damages only, the courts will not regard his 
action as one for punitive damages also." 
* * * 
"':ro entitle a person to exemplary damages, 
he must set up distinctly in his complaint the 
elements that make up the basis of his claim 
for such damages and must make such averments 
as will advise the defendant that he will have to 
meet a demand of that kind at the trial." 
Another trouble about exemplary damages here is 
that this case has now been made by this Court and 
the trial Court a case of a partnership operation for 
the benefit of plaintiff and one of the defendants. So 
that whatever the former intent as to breaking up the 
partnership, the Court did not pennit it to be broken 
up. Therefore, there is nothing in this case now on 
which to predicate punitive damages. There was a good 
honest operation for plaintiff's benefit. It is not as if a 
partner so operating has acted fraudulently to rob, or 
to damage his partner's interest. 
3. Action for Damage, if One Existed, 1cas Wai1,~ed by 
Election. 
If we are correct in the foregoing contentions this 
one need not be considered. However, we cannot escape 
the conclusion that this case, being so firmly laid as one 
30 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in equity for n partnership accounting, eon~tituted an 
election, and waived plaintiff's eause of adion for dam-
age, if he eYer had one. Drunages did not and could 
not arise, as we haYe shown, a~ an elenwnt of recovery 
in the accounting, principally because da1nagP~ cannot 
rest upon acts of disrupting a partnership at will. 
A~suming, howe-ver, that a partner by unauthorized 
dissolution n1ay ever have both a legal right to damages 
and an equitable right to a partnership accounting, does 
he waive the former if he chooses the latter, by suit 
to judgn1ent' One of these, of course, the latter would 
rest upon the basis of right of ownership of the partner-
ship property and the benefit of its operation. The other 
claim would have to rest upon the breach of the contract, 
and the taking and using of the property for the benefit 
of the defaulting partner. 
On the subject of election of remedies, 18 Am. Jur. 
discusses this, pages 149 to 160, and the discussion there 
leads quite conclusively, we think, to the inevitable con-
clusion that we have here an election and waiver. We 
will point to some of the more pertinent statements. 
18 Am. Jur., p. 151: 
"31. Election of Legal, as Precluding Equi-
table, Remedy, and Vice V ersa.-A party who 
has a choice between legal and equitable remedies 
cannot ordinarily pursue them both at the same 
time. The one proceeding may abate the other, 
or the litigant may be com-pelled to elect which 
he will prosecute." 
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"An inconsistency between the legal and the 
equitable remedy exists where the one proceeds 
in affirmance and the other in disaffirmance of 
the contract upon which the suits are based or 
where relief in the one suit is predicated on title 
in the plaintiff, and in the other, on title in de-
fendant." 
The election and waiver appear to be conclusive 
whether based upon a waiver of tort and a suit in 
assumpsit, or whether based upon an election between 
two alternative contract remedies. 
'See, 18 Am. Jttr., pp. 155-156 and p.158. 
Cook v. Covey Ballard Co., 253 P. 196, is the leading 
case in this state discussing the general 9-uestion of 
election, and under the foregoing authority we appear 
to have an election here, as indicated by that case (P. 
199-200). The case holds that, where there are two 
co-existing remedies which are alternative, the bringing 
an action on one indicates a choice which waives the 
other one. 
1Jf oropoulos v. F,u1ler, 200 P. 601. 
This case has been heretofore cited on another point. 
In it, the Supreme Court of California, in passing upon 
a demurrer pointed out two possible remedies existing 
where the partnership was for a definite term. The 
plaintiff had given his partner a mortgage, and they had 
also entered upon a substantial farming and livestock 
operation. The defaulting partner by fake assignment 
of tbe mortgage and fake foreclosures by defendant 
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a~signees Iuanipnlated the propertiPs into the hands 
of these colluding defendants. 
The innocent partner elected "to sub1nit to this 
wrongful appropriation * • * and to bring action for 
the damages personally suffered." (P. 605). The Court 
states, that "in the fonu of action elected by plaintiff 
he can recoYer only for such dan1ages as would inure to 
himself individually. Had he retained the business OJnd 
carried it on under the terms of the partnership agree-
ment he 1rould be held to an acco·unting to his former 
partner or his assignee for their prorrortion of the net 
profits and its rem.aining assets." 
Since the property here was decreed to have been 
so kept and operated, this election makes this latter 
remedy the exclusive one, even if it had not already 
been so anyway. 
POINT II. 
IT WAS ERROR TO CHARGE AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANTS THE SUM OF' $1,932.00 FOR SO-
CALLgD "IDLE TL\[E" OF PARTNERSHIP EQUIP-
MENT. 
Given here, by the pleadings and evidence and the 
sustaining decree of this Court, a continuing partner-
ship operation for the benefit of plaintiff as one of the 
partners, we can see no sound legal theory upon which 
he could charge the other partner at all, for time when 
partnership may not have been operated. 
This equipment was operated just as it was agreed 
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by the partners it would be operated. That is, by defend-
ant Street on a hourly wage basis. That is the contract 
that is being enforced, in order to give plaintiff a remedy 
here. His remedy, so provided him, is the right to the 
partnership accounting granted and rendered, and an 
equal division of net earnings. 
The uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Street, as cited 
above, is that the equipment was operated continuously 
and at all time, except when its condition of repair or 
the condition of the weather' would not permit (278, 281). 
His, and also that of the other witnesses who testified 
on this, was that during severe freezing weather, and 
particularly in January, the equipment could not be 
operated (280, 243, 276, 293-6). This equipment could not 
be operated in this January of 1945, as witness Roberts 
testified ( 325). 
The Court finds (117) that "the use of the assets 
* * * and the conduct of the partnership business were 
carried on by Street assisted by Siegel, with reasonable 
diligence, with the exception of thirty-four days." That 
the rental value of the equipment for this "idle time" 
was $1,932.00 ( 117). Then the Court charges the defend-
ants and credits the partnership with this amount as 
additional income, and on this, orders partner Street to 
pay partner Graham one-half of this, or $966.00, out of 
his own pocket. 
It will be conceded, we think, that none of this was 
ever received by Mr. Street and that the rental of this 
equipment was never contemplated by the partnership 
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agreement or eon~ ide red by the partner~ ( :28-l, :n -l-:r11). 
There i~ al~o nothing in the partnership agTPPlllPnt bPing-
enforced here, calling for or de1nanding continuouH 
operation, or the aecounting for the failure of such by 
either partner. That no ~neh liability by one against 
another partner ari~P~ out of a partner~hip relationship, 
is indi~pntable. 
\Yith this in n1ind, we make the following additional 
objections to these findings and the judgn1ent based 
thereon: 
First, such liability could enter or become a proper 
itmn of the partnership accounting only if agreed to in 
the partnership agree1nent. That agreement, however, 
has been pleaded, proved and defined and affirmed as one 
for equal division of net profits, and the accounting as 
ordered is on this basis only (90). Nothing of this un-
usual liability was ever before claimed or even suggested 
here. 
It clearly could only get into the cBse otherwise than 
by agreement. (a) As a measure of damages for 
breach of a partnership contract for a term, (Note 4 
ALR 158) or (b) as damages in tort, for such as conver-
sion of, or injury to partnership property. But, cer-
tainly any such cause and such damages must be pleaded 
and pro,vecl, and so all that has been presented in support 
of Point I applies additionally to this allowance of dam-
ages. This includes the authority cited that such damages 
cannot be based on this kind of contract at all. 
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8econd, if it could be claimed that Mr. Street is liable 
because the duty owed to the partnership to operate the 
equipment under this agreement was one by him person-
ally, and not on the part of the partners, or either of 
them, as such partners, that claim is not here either. 
When the amended complaint was filed, and when the 
judgment thereon was entered for this accounting, the 
operation had entirely ceased and the accounting was 
ordered on what had been done. If any contract or 
duty had then been breached by the failure to operate 
equipment by Mr. Street as an employ~e of the partner-
ship on the hourly basis agreed, still this claim has never 
been raised or suggested at all. 
Thirdly, and to so charge Mr. Street as an employee, 
an appropriate action would be necessary based on alle-
gations showing this duty and the delict in respect there-
to, so that he could defend. 
Fourthly, and not only is there no pleading as 
against him on this, but again there is no pleading at all, 
purporting to make any claim against either defendant 
of this character. This defendant, who was certainly not 
directly charged with operating the equipment, was never 
put on notice that any charge against him of this kind 
would pop up after the end of the trial. 
Fifthly, it is no part of the accounting or receipts 
and expenses as ordered (90, 432) by the Court and which 
we filed. Nor could it have been contemplated or ex-
pected as any part of a partnership accounting. Further-
more, we can find no objection or exception to the ac-
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count that was rendered, ::·ql~!)~·pst ing :.m~T such on1i:.;sion. 
Sixth, there is no f'Yidence that the equipment was in 
condition to operate or t•ould be operated during any of 
the~E' 3-l days, so far as wP can find. r:rhere appears to 
be no evidence that "defendants ust>d'' the equipment 
"from ~\ngnst 6, 1943." It was elearl~· not in condition 
to be used, at least not until the 1Gth when they started 
on the first Oran joh (Ex . .N. p. 2). This accounts for 
ten of the thirty-four days for which rental was charged. 
There is likewise no evidence "that for the seventeen 
days" between "Deceinher :2(i, 19-l--l- and Jan. 1:2, 1945" this 
equipment was in condition to be operated or that the 
weather would permit its operation. For these seven-
teen days, the Court charges defendants because in this 
period (117) "Street kept possession thereof for hiin-
self and the defendant Siegel." Of course, Street had 
possession of the equir)lnent - that was the agreement. 
The evidence is, without dispute, that it couldn't be 
operated when sold in January. In fact it was only after 
ten days in the shop and costly repairs (325) that the 
Buyer, ).fr. Roberts, could operate it at all and then it 
was too cold ( 325). 
Seventh, and this is even worse, the Court gets this 
$1,932.00 (117) hy charging $773.00 per month on the 
"cat" and $193.00 on the "ripsnorter blade." This is 
$9G6.00 a month. But, then there is added another $966.00 
for the other four days, of the 34 idle time found. Since, 
as already shown, if there was any such time, it was less 
than one rnonth, this total could not exceed $966.00. 
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Eightly, the Court's charge of rental on the so-called 
"Western ripsnorter" at "$193.00 per month" (117) ap-
pears to he without any basis. This equipment was first 
referred to in evidence as "scarifier" then as a "ripper," 
and nobody seemed to he very clear about what this was 
(254 ). 
But the testimony of Mr. Street, is undisputed, that 
whether it was a "ripper" or a "scarifier" it was never 
removed from Bothwells in Salt Lake, from whom the 
equipment was purchased, and was never used by Mr. 
Street ( 316). 
Ninth, the rental values charged appear not to be 
fair or equitable. While plaintiff's e~pert witness did 
testify that OP A on the same kind of equipment (except 
possibly larger) would allow rent for the OP A ceiling, 
and quotes the figures which appear to be based on that, 
this witness also testified that he, and no one else, would 
then lease out such caterpillar and bulldozer equipment 
because the drastic use to which such equipment is put 
depreciates it so rapidly, that actually loss would re-
sult from leasing it at these rates (235-6, 241). And 
such could not ever be rented for brief periods anyway 
(244). In any event, 34 days of use would have cost up-
keep and depreciation. 
Both the witnesses who actually operated and worked 
on this equip1nent testified that it was not at any time 
from the beginning, during, or at the end of this opera-
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If the Court's finding of thirty-four days "idle time'' 
out of about one year and fiYe nwnths, or s01ne 51f> days, 
were accepted, it would still be a pretty fair record of op-
eration by a partner. 
\Yhen this 34 days is reduced by the evidence afore-
said by about :27 days leaving only about seven, the record 
is remarkable. Perhaps e-ven a better showing could have 
been made, if there had been a pleading to advise us 
that this question would come up or be considered at all. 
There was certainly no sense or object in ~Ir. Street 
not operating if he could. At that time he considered him-
self to be the principal beneficiary of every hour of op-
eration. The Record is quite conclusive that, while he 
didn't at that time know that he was working for plaintiff, 
he performed very faithfully, and at time very difficult 
service, under rugged conditions and in some severe 
weather (284-305). 
POINT III 
IT vVAS ERROR TO STRIKE F'ROM ACCOUNT-
ING THE EXPENSE ITEM OF $170.57 PAID FOR 
LIABILITY INSURANCE IN THE PARTNERSHIP 
EQUIP1IENT (116). 
We have made objection to the elimination from the 
accounting rendered of the credit of $170.57 paid for in-
surance premiums covering liability insurance on the 
partnership equipment. Such insurance, of course, pro-
tects the operators agaii~st public liability. 
It should be admitted that accidental injury, such 
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as might be caused by operating and moving this equip-
ment about, could very well wipe out these profits, and 
take considerable more from the partners. 
The trial Court in this connection, and in disallow-
ing Siegel's telephone expenses for call~ in this operation, 
said that he "did not incur" such "in the interest of the 
partnership • * * but such expenses, if any, were incur-
red by him as an interloper * * *." We make no claim 
here as to these telephone calls, even though the testi-
mony was uncontradicted, but it is not clear whether 
the disallowance of the insurance premium in (e) (116) 
was on this same basis, or was because the Court didn't 
believe the insurance premium was paid. 
We submit that in this operation, which this Court 
on appeal held would be treated in equity as an opera-
tion "by Street and Siegel" for the "benefit of the 
Graham-Street partnership," any fair and reasonable 
expenses incurred and paid are a proper partnership 
expense. This is such. And to disallow it, because it was 
paid by Mr. Siegel, is to do violence to this Court's de-
cision. On this basis all expense items could be disallow-
ed, because 1\fr. 'Siegel paid them practically all, and then 
there could be no accounting as ordered. 
The evidence, if that is the basis of disallowance, 
has been cited above. It is undisputed that they had such 
a policy, that it wast he usual policy at the "going rate," 
and the payment was made and was allowed to :Mr. Siege] 
by Mr. Street in their checkup with each other, and it 
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was entered as an expense in ~lr. Street's account (13, 
1-!5, 180. 18-t, 1D:2). 
Plaintiff, in his suppletnental con1plnint ( 18) made 
eleven written objections to the account as rendered. 
Many of them were specific objections, but no objection 
was n1ade to this item. Questions were asked Mr. 
Street by plaintiff's counsel with reference to it, along 
with several iten1s in the account (174-179). There was 
no more reason for us to believe that any more techni-
cal proof of this iten1 would be required than any of the 
two to three hundred other items in this account (9-13) 
which likewise had not been- specifically objected to. Its 
payment was not put in dispute. The accounts kept were 
presumably, and, under the circumstances, naturally 
kept accurately. 
'\Y e have not found any case directly in point in this 
matter. '\Ye are all familiar with the general law in deal-
ing with banks and in other situations, that accounts ren-
dered under such circumstances that they would naturally 
be examined will be taken, at least after a long lapse of 
time, to be prima facie correct, if not objected to. 
In 11 A.L.R. at Page 694 and 75 A.L.R. at P. 1289, 
rases are cited under the general heading: 
"The general rule that an account stated is 
binding in the absence of proof of fraud or mis-
take is applicable to accounts stated between part-
ners." 
This may not be technically an "account stated" even 
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though defendants' counsel had it for about six years 
before the trial. 
However, at 11 A.L.R. 604, a case is cited from Ark. 
and discussed in the note by the author who states the 
holding as follows: 
"Where partners have had mutual dealings, 
and one renders to the other a statement purport-
ing to set forth all the items of indebtedness on 
the one side and of credit on the other, the account 
so rendered, if not objected to in a reasonable 
time, becomes an account stated, and cannot after-
wards be impeached except for fraud or mistake.'' 
In any event, it seems that good legal practice would 
entitle us to have an item of this kind in a long account 
called to our attention if objected to or disputed, or if 
more technical proof is wanted. Otherwise, litigants 
would be put to the necessity of producing the best evi-
dence on every item of account, and litigation could be 
interminable. 
Anyway, the item and its payment were proved hy 
testimony elicited mainly by defendant and not objected 
to, or in any part contradicted. 
POINT IV. 
IT WAS ERROR rro CHARGE INTEREST OX 
BALANCE OF THE ACCOUNT ON THE PARTNER-
SHIP ACCOUNTING; ESPECIALLY TO CHARGE 
INTEREST FOR SEVEN Y E A R S AFTER 1946 
WHEN THE ACCOUNTING WAS RENDERED 
BY DEFENDANTS AS ORDERED, AND IT \VAS 
EVER SINCE REJECTED BY PLAINTIFF. 
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rl'his is an accounting between partner~ in Pquity, 
so that the law with relation to the charging of interest 
between partners applies. It was ordered by the trial 
Court ( 90) and by this Court on appeal ( P. 535). After 
the case went down, there was served and entered a 
further order by the trial Court ( -!3:2) advising that the 
case had con1e down and directing that the accounting 
ordered be filed in ~0 days. The accounting (8-16) was 
filed Septen1ber 3, 1946, and settlement then tendered 
on the basis thereof. 
Thereafter, and after plaintiff had filed his supple-
mental complaint, this defendant Siegel, in his answer 
thereto in 1948 added two overlooked items of receipts 
(52) totaling $174.62 as found by the Court (116). Then 
with this addition he reconciled his and Street's accounts 
(53) and showed by his accounting total receipts of $17,-
2:3-±.53, and a net, in the operation account (54), of $10,-
039.33. 
In addition to this, Mr. Siegel then charged himself 
with the $4,500.00 agreed to be paid for the partner-
. ship equipment and also the $2,000.00 received from his 
equipment and then below (54) credited himself with this 
$G,500.00 and also the interest allowed on $4,500.00 paid 
hy him for the partnership equipment, and also "$4,500.-
00" paid to Street; and by this operation reached a net 
halance in the operation of $4,965.58 (54). This covered 
return on all equipment including defendant's .. 
The Court found a balance due plaintiff alone on this 
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accounting of $2,974.01 (119). This would make the total 
operation earning in excess of $5,800.00. 
However, it will be noticed (116) that the allowance 
to Mr. Street as wages was reduced by the Court from 
$1.50 claimed to $1.25 per hour, and to a total for this of 
$3,480.62. The most important difference, however, is in 
the allowance of the $1,932.00 as rental value for idle 
time discussed in Point II above. When half of this, 
$966.00, is deducted from the $2,974.01, the amount then 
found due is reduced to $2,008.01, and if one-half the in-
surance premium of $170.57, which is $85.28, discussed 
in Point III, is deducted the net balance due plaintiff is 
$1,922.73. 
Again in this defendant's answer, filed in 1948, he 
asked that the account be settled and asked that the Court 
direct him in the payment of the funds in his hands from 
this operation (50). This is another tender of settlement 
at that time. 
A point of importance in applying the law is that this 
account could have been considered and settled in 1946 
when it was supplied pursuant to the Court orders, ex-
cept for the contentions of the plaintiff, himself then and 
ever since that this settlement should be disregarded en-
tirely and the exhorbitant amounts claimed as rental 
value paid him as damages (20) (171). 
Considering the hundreds of items contained in the 
account and that the changes in the actual account is in 
only three or four of such items, the defendants cannot 
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be held responsible for the delay in getting it checked and 
settled. The Court in fact found ( 115) that the account 
was filed purporting to ~et forth "the itmns of account 
ordered by thi~ Court, which accounting clearly reflectH 
all of the receipts to the partnership Graham and Street 
during the period • • $." 
The differences are only in the expenses claimed and 
those allowed by the Court, and these are few and not 
significant. They could have been settled shortly, at any 
time. \V e have been anxious for all of these years to 
get this account settled. It is plain from the record here 
that plaintiff has never been willing and will not now 
accept any of the funds received in this operation, or ac-
cept this method of settlement at all (171). So we can't 
pay him. 
There is no contract for the payment of interest here 
and, of course, there had never been any prayer, or de-
mand, or order for payments of interest on this account. 
The judgment of the Court ( 121) against each de-
fendant is for interest "from January 12, 1945, in the 
sum of $1,338.30." January 12th is the date on which the 
equipment was sold. Assuming that an accounting was 
then due plaintiff, as the trial Court and this Court have 
found, there seems to be no basis in law for the charging 
of interest immediately to one of the partners, before a 
balance was struck. 
This judgment was entered July 12,1952. That is ex-
actly six years and six months after the date on which 
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the equipment was sold, and from which the interest 
was dated. It is of some, but not major importance on 
this, that we are unable to arrive at the figure found by 
the Court. In the absence of a contract, the legal rate of 
interest of 6% ( 44-0-1) would seem to apply .. For six and 
one-half years this would amount to 39% and 39% of the 
$2,97 4.01 on which it is based, would be $1,159.86, instead 
of $1338.30 ( 122). 
40 Am. Jur., P. 383: 
"362. Dissolution or Termination of Finn.-
On the dissolution of a partnership, interest is 
not ordinarily allowable as between the partners 
during the period of settlement of the partnership 
affairs if there is no unnecessary delay or im-
proper use of the partnership funds, since the de-
lay which is necessary and incidental to the wind-
ing up of the partnership business cannot be 
ascribed to one partner more than another. This 
is true even though the interest of the partners 
may be unequal. However, there are a few au-
thorities, for the most part earlier ones, which 
take the view that in adjusting partnership ac-
count~ it is proper to Inake a rest at the time of 
dissolution of the firm and allow interest from 
that time upon balances then due the respective 
partners. 
* * * 
"Interest may be allowable after a judgment 
according to which a definite amount is found to 
be owing from one partner to another which is 
payable immediately. But there must be default in 
payment by a partner to his co-partner, and not 
merely retention of an ascertained balance, in 
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order to 'U'arraut the allowan<'e of iule,rcst after 
dissolution." 
40 Am. Jur., P. 385 
"86±.-Unreasonable Delay in Settlement.-lf 
there i~ an unreasonable dPlay in settling the part-
nership affairs after dissolution or ter1nination 
of the partnership, or an unjustifiable refusal to 
account, a partner who i~ in possession of the 
ftmds of the firn1 and is responsible for the delay 
or refusal1nay, on equitable grounds, be charged 
with interest on such funds frmn the tilne when 
he should haYe accounted.'' 
We simply point out again in this connection that 
there has been no delay, so far as settlmnent of the part-
nership account is concerned, due to us. It has been due 
entirely to the clain1 of unjustifiable damages on the 
part of plaintiff, and his demand that the accounting 
basis be rejected. 
While the following section is not directly in point 
on our situation, as are sections 362 and 364 of American 
Jurisprudence above, there is this statement with refer-
ence to interest generally, by this author which might 
at first appear to give the Court discretion in the matter 
of interest here. 
40 Am. Jur., P. 377 
"353. Generally.-While it is quite impos-
sible to lay down any unbending rule on the ques-
tion whether interest should be allowed or dis-
allowed on partnership accounts, the general rule 
appears to be that in the absence of an agreement 
to the contrary, interest is not to be allowed on 
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partnership accounts until after a balance is 
struck, but may be charged if under the circum-
stances of the particular case the equities so re-
quire. Its allowance or disallowance is, to a large 
extent, discretionary with the court, and depends 
largely on the circumstances of the particular 
case." 
This author in thus discussing the matter of equities 
and discretion cites in support of this statement the An-
notation in 66 A.L.R. commencing on Page 3. 
At Page 22 of this note there is a general statement 
which is substantially the same as that just quoted, as 
follows: 
''It may be said that, ordinarily in the settle-
ment of partnership accounts, interest should not 
be allowed until after a balance is struck on a 
settlement between the partners, unless there is a 
different agreement between them or unless under 
the peculiar facts and circumstances, the equities 
demand that interest be charged." 
The author then cites in note 61, on page 22 a number 
of cases. These cases and all of them where interest 
is allowed appear to relate to situations like that set 
forth above in 'Sec. 364, where there is unjustifiable delay 
by a partner in making payment. This note cites two or 
three cases on Page 23 pointing out that there must be 
a special agreement or, as stated in one of them, "some 
very special and peculiar state of facts." 
On Page 23 is cited a case where a partner un-
justifiably overdrew his account and another where the 
accounts and also the funds were concealed by one part-
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ner, who refused an accounting. These indicate the ehar-
acter of the ''yery special" <>ircmn~tances which might 
justify interest. And ther~ is also cited at Page ~-l- an-
other case which is important here: 
lrilson r. lrilkinsou, (Ga.) :.;3 S.E. D09, and the hold-
ing is stated as follows: 
"upon an eqnitahlt> petition by one partner 
against another for a settle1nent of the partner-
ship accounts, interest is not generally allowable 
in favor of one as against the other upon an 
unpaid balance; that, to authorize the allowance 
of such interest, the particular facts upon which 
interest is clain1ed and allowed nn1st not only be 
alleged in the petition, and proved on the trial, 
hut the findings of fact upon this issue must be 
favorable to the contention of the plaintiff as an 
indispensable predieate for the allowance of such 
interest in the final decree." 
So that again we have no pleading here, as we sug-
gested above, otherwise, evidence might have been of-
fered that would even more completely indicate the fault 
for the delay. There is no finding that we are at fault 
on this. 
To avoid possible confusion on this, and perhaps 
anticipate a contention that might be made by plaintiff, 
we point out that the fraud in colluding to terminate 
this partnership doesn't, so far as we can see from the 
cases collected in these notes or in the general digests, 
have any bearing on his question. 
The so-called conspiracy and joint action to exclude 
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plaintiff was the thing that resulted in equity giving to 
plaintiff a cause of action for the accounting he had 
a~ked. The right and the basis of the accounting ordered 
were just as if he had not been excluded, at all. In other 
words, the equity Court had extended the term of plain-
tiff's partnership at will and had made it a partnership 
for the whole term of this operation. 
'rhe entire operation, when this decision of the Court 
was made and when the accounting was ordered, had been 
finished and ended. The things to be included in the ac-
counting ordered was then fully recited (90) in the Order. 
The only, or "very special" acts that could thereafter 
happen to justify interest, didn't happen at all so far as 
defendants are concerned. And, there is no claim or find-
ing that any such did occur. 
The fact is that Mr. Street has not received the 
money that might be due him on this particular settle-
ment for the reason that Mr. Siegel can't pay out the 
money until this account is settled and; as indicated in 
the citations above, if one partner is entitled to interest, 
the other one is too. 
In any event l\1r. Street has clearly not delayed the 
settlement of this account. This defendant has stated to 
the Court, before and now, that he is ready to pay. The 
plaintiff, by his pleadings and repeated contentions for 
damages in lieu of the partnership settlement, has alone 
delayed it. 
Ice v. Kilworth, (Kan.) 114 P. 857, and Riebel v. 
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< Jfullcr, (~linn.) ~~G N.,r. D~-t, GG A.L.R. 1, are two ea::-;PH 
holding that interest is not chargeable even on advances 
made by one partner to the partnership until a halmH·e 
is ~truck, in the ahsenee of an agremnent therefor. 
Slwlkiu l'. Sludkin, GG K.E. :2d G-1-t, 118 A.L.R. 629. 
'rhe opinion of the ~Iassaclrn~rtts Supreme Court in 
this case is son1ewhat helpful on this point. Here the 
two of the partners secretly drew out substantial surns 
of money wrongfully. Smne of the n1oney taken was en-
tered in the books as having been paid out for "pur-
chases~' and "cash purchases" ( P. 635). Other money 
collected was withheld by thern and not turned in at all 
(P. 636). On such amounts, so in effect stolen and kept, 
the referee allowed interest and the Court sustained this 
"under the circun1stances," after stating that "as a rule, 
interest is not chargeable arnong partners in the absence 
of some agreement." 
The date at which interest should commence was an 
issue between the parties and this was computed to the 
date when an order was entered settling the accounting, 
although the actual decree was not entered until about 
three months later (P. 639). We point this out particu-
larly because even under those circumstances interest 
wa~ not allowed from the time that an accounting was 
due and was demanded, but only from the date that the 
balance was struck. On this the opinion says : 
"We think it was proper for the trial judge to 
order that it be con1puted to the date when the in-
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nocent party would be in the position to receive 
what was due him." 
We are entirely agreeable that interest be charged 
from the date when the plaintiff here will put himself in 
position to receive the funds derived from this operation, 
and from this accounting. 
rrlwre i~, we believe, no authority allowing interest 
to a party while he refuses to accept settlement; or any 
authority, for allowing the interest charged here. 
POINT \T. 
rr WAS ERROR TO REJECT AND STRIKE DE-
FENDANT'S ALLEGATIONS AND TO REFUSE rro 
CONSIDER PLAINTIFF'S LACHES OR INEQUIT-
ABLE DELAYS, INEQUITABLE CLAIMS, AND IN-
EQUITABLE CONDUCT AND FAILURE TO DO OR 
OFFER TO DO EQUITY. 
While we do not waive the point as stated, or the 
striking of our defenses, we will not argue these matters 
at length. vVe will briefly discuss what appears to be the 
failure below to consider the inequity of rewarding and 
enriching plaintiff, far beyond any possible loss. 
This is an action in equity. After it had been de-
-~lared and affirmed as such and the items of the required 
which this plaintiff filed demurrers and a motion to 
strike. 
The Court sustained these objections in a minute 
entry ( 42). Thus, for example, was eliminated from our 
answer the objection ( 46) that damages for rent were 
not pleadable in the case as laid and that rental of the· 
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accounting defined (90), the plaintiff hy his supplPnwntal 
complaint demanded drunages based on alleged past and 
future rentals in excess of $140,000.00 (20), nnd tlwn'-
" after on the trial prayed for $50,000.00 additional a~ puni- / 
tive damages ( 21). rro this fornle\· demand, this defend- . 
ant filed an ans\Yer ~ 44) setting up eertain defenses, to 
t¥ equipment was not c~nt~ntplated, and that the .eq~ip-
z: / ment wa~, in fact, operated as agreed; also our obJectwn 
/ that future profits were not pleadable in an action on a 
/ partnership at will: also the claim that the plaintiff was 
/ not entitled to earnings fro:tit:the operation of this defend-
i ant's O-\Vn equip1nent. ..:-\lso was eliminated the allegation 
_, 
-.:I that plaintiff had never indicated to defendant that he 
~- ( wanted to possess this partnership equipment or desired 
-~ \ to participate in this operation, and that this defendant 
·Jhad invested additional funds in expenses and equip-
. m. ent (48), and that plaintiff had.waited and speculated 
· ( 49) on the outcome. _ . ! • ~ ~· >-<-;r-~>- --
•, \Vhile we were thus deprived of going into some of 
these defenses as such, we desire now briefly to point out 
that this account properly settled will give plaintiff 
not alone the only remedy available, but also a remedy 
which is adequate. 
Plaintiff had no investment in this partnership. The 
partnership property was paid for by this defendant. 
Plaintiff ran no risk, therefore, of loss of capital. He 
devoted no time to this business, and apparently did not 
expect to. The only equipment that the partnership had 
was actually operated full time. It could do no more than 
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it did. It could not have been used and it never was in-
tended to be used for any different purposes than that 
to which it was put. It was used and operated by the 
party that plaintiff had agreed would use and operate it, 
and at the costs, and for the rate of return expected. 
Plaintiff, at the beginning, as this Court found, had 
proposed relinquishing all his interest for $1,000.00 (P. 
535). He had no money in it, and his partnership had no 
term of existence. Notwithstanding this, the proper ac-
counting will give him 1 g L about twice what he pro-
posed selling out for. 
A note 21 A.L.R., at Page 75, dealing with damages 
recoverable even where there is a term of existence pro-
vided for the partnership, says: 
"In fact it has been said that the true measure 
of damages is the actual1noney value of the plain-
tiff's interest in the contract of partnership at the 
time of the breach * * * ." 
Citing Reiter v. Morton, 96 Pa. 229. 
The plaintiff went ahead operating his business, just 
as he had engaged and always intended doing; and de-
voted his whole time and attention to it, so reaping all 
the profits fron1 this, and now also half the net from this 
equipment. 
By applying the principle that equity would consider 
as done what this Court concluded should have been done 
under the agreement contemplated here, and thereby 
(1) treating the title to the equipment as having actually 
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passed to the partnership; and (2) treating the operation 
of it as having been for the benefit of the partnership; 
and (3) applying to the operation the terms of the at-
tempted agremnent of partnership, this Court has given 
all that plaintiff could have expected if there had been no 
attempt to disrupt the conten1plated partnership arrange-
ments. 
In 21 A.L.R. at 73, the author cites a number of cases 
in support of the stateinent there made that even where 
there is a contract for a definite term, and a breach by 
dissolution, 
"the dmnages recoverable include the value 
of the profits which the plain tiff otherwise would 
have received, or the value to him of the continu-
ance of the agreement during the covenanted 
term." 
The Court ~xpressly (118) found that the "agree-
ment provides,"~ was to receive one-half. 
In any event, this operation produced net for the 
partnership almost the total cost of their equipment, 
in approximately 15 months time, which seems to be a 
very good return. And the partners never paid anything 
for or on the equipment used. 
19 .·I m.. Jur., P. 188, Sec. 240: 
Here the author pointed out that in some circunl-
stances a person seeking equity must offer to do equity. 
And that, in general, a person lllust do equity as a condi-
tion to the granting of relief in equity. 
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19 Am. Jur., P. 319, Sec. 462-463: 
Here the author points out that Courts of equity 
will consider whether the conduct of one who seeks relief 
has been in accordance with the standards of equity, 
and also said that: 
"Nothing can call this Court into activity but 
conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence. 
Where these are wanting the Court is passive 
and does nothing." 
"By appealing to the equitable jurisdiction, 
the complainant is deemed tc have submitted 
himself to the Court's decision as to what is neces~ 
sary to do justice to the defendant as determined 
in the light of equitable principles." 
"The principle is as applicable to a party de-
fendant as it is a party cornplainant." 
It doesn't seem equitable to us, under the cir-
cumstances here, for a party to claim the exorbitant 
amount claimed here as rental damages; nor does it seem 
equitable to award to plaintiff, in addition to the amount 
due him under the accounting, the $5,000.00 as general, 
or the $5,000.00 as punitive damages. These are not only 
not legally -..available, but they have not been claimed 
by plaintiff by any allegation, or established by any evi-
dence, but they have, nevertheless, been added by the 
Court below. 
Note, that the findings as cited above of "turmoil 
and anxiety" and "dis)fsses and anxieties" (118) are 
totally non-existent by any claim or proof. 
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On the other hand, consider briefly the treatment 
given this defendant here. He alone financed the opera-
tion. He has been denied any ren1uneration for his time, 
or for his !elephone expenses or automobile expenseH 
in making calls or trips, or for his legal or accounting 
costs paid. He is out all these. He alone risked any capi-
tal. The Court has found that he agreed to loan on this 
worn and broken down equipment the full cost thereof, 
and it is so settled that he did, but it is also conclusive, 
as testified by three witnesses in the evidence cited above, 
that he got for this equipn1ent only the pron1ise of .Mr. 
Roberts to pay him back $4,056.00 of the $4,500.00 that he 
paid for it. Also, that only the $56.00 of this had been 
paid after six years, and up until the trial of this cause 
of action. This 1936 equipment was then fifteen years old, 
the buyer had gone in the hole on it, and it seems to be 
reasonable to conclude that this defendant will never 
receive this $4,000.00. 
It see1ns to us that it would be wholly inequitable 
and unjust to impose upon him the additional amounts 
of damages and punitive damages and so-called idle 
time rentals and interest aggregating $12,204.30 over 
and above the amount due from defendant to plaintiff 
on the accounting. This is so, even if plaintiff had a legal 
right to such damages, which he has not, and if defendant 
had been given notice and opportunity to defend as to 
these, which he was not. 
He is plainly required tp dig deeply in his own 
pocket the amounts paid and to be paid on the accounting 
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even after that is reduced as above outlined. How, in 
equity, can he be penalized by this $12,000.00 in addi-
tion to the $4,000.00 which he is out on the equipment, 
when he has run the only risks of this ... operation, 
and has gained nothing? 
And particularly, on what principle of equity, or 
how in good conscience, is the plaintiff entitled to receive 
this great additional reward and gratuity; and on what 
can it be claimed to be based~ Plaintiff elected the only 
remedy he had. 
CONCLUSION 
In this equity case charging defendants with uniting 
in disrupting a partnership at will, or charging the ex-
cluding of a partner in such a partnership from the op-
eration of partnership property, there can be no recovery 
of the dan1ages assessed, either cmnpensatory or puni-
tive. On this the law appears to be firmly settled. 
And, even if this were a partnership for a term, since 
plaintiff elected after such partnership operation had 
ended to sue in equity for an accounting and actually 
procured such to be ordered and supplied, such damages, 
if pleaded, could not be added to the judgn1ent settling the 
account. 
And certainly this could not be legally done with no 
pleadings or claims to base them on, or to enable the 
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Furthermore, the election of the ettui table n'BH'd.\· 
of accounting under the law applicable to such a partner-
ship at will and in thi~ 8ituation would seen1 to consti-
tute an election of rernedies which would bar the plead-
ing of causes of actions for sueh danwgP~, if ~nch hnd 
been a tten1pted. 
K o aets, exeept the attempt to disrupt or the disrupt-
ing of a partnership at will, and the exelusion of a part-
ner as above stated, are plead rd as a cause of action here. 
And so the trial Court clearly went off the track that 
had been laid as a Lasis of recovery at all here; or any 
track which could be laid under the eircumstanres, in 
adding such judg1nent for dmnage. 
These principles apply to the allowance of $1,932.00 
rental charges for so-called idle time of equipment, as do 
also the authorities cited in support of Point I. And, 
too, this finding as to rental value damages is not :-;up-
ported by any evidence as shown under the discussion of 
this under Point II. ~lore could have been said as to 
this item of damage, but this "idle time" danmge had not 
been claimed by plaintiff, and cannot be justified or sup-
ported at all, and it may not he defended on this appeal. 
~rhe addition of interest by one partner against the 
other, in the amount of $1,338.30, is likewise subject to 
the principles cited in support of Points I and II in the 
matter of pleading, claim or notice. And, in addition, we 
have shown that it is basically contrary to law. 
The insurance policy premium, while not of great 
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importance, appears to have been improperly disallowed 
as an operative expense deduction. It was not objected 
to or put in, dispute and it was sustained by evidence 
offered, without objection. It is one of the larger ex-
pense items disallowed. 
With the elimination from the balance found on the 
accounting of one-half of this rental damage item of $1,-
932.00, discussed under Point II, and with the slight ad-
justment which we believe is required by Point III, the 
account itself as struck by the Court iR in the amount of 
$1,922.73, due plaintiff. We have not contended for any 
other or further adjustment or reduction. We have ten-
dered a full accounting as ordered by the Court and it is 
the remedy to which plaintiff is, and has been found to 
be, entitled. 
As pointed out, for all that plaintiff actually put into 
this partnership undertaking, or all that he agreed or 
intended to put into it, this is also a very good return. 
· On the other hand, further to penalize this defendant, 
and particularly in the additional amounts allowed here, 
would be wholly unconscionable, inequitable and unjust. 
We ask again that the Court settle this account so 
that this defendant can be able to make payment herein 
and be authorized to use the partnership funds in his 
hands insofar as such funds will enable him to make such 
payment, of the balance due on the account. 
We respectfully submit that the allowance of com-
pensatory, idle time rental, and punitive damages, and 
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also interest on the account, except on the balance when 
struck, should be reversed and these portions of the 
conclusions and decree elilninated before final judgment 
settling the account. 
That the Court should affirm the judgment on the ac-
counting, but in the corrected and legal amount. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MULLINER, PRINCE & MULLINER 
Attorneys for Appellant, Max Siegel 
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